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$EVWUDFW
This paper presents the economic rationales of government intervention into 
innovation activities and into the supply of innovation-related services as inputs in 
innovation processes. There are two approaches to the question of the economic 
rationale of government involvement in technological advance and innovation 
activities. One is the neo-classical of market failure and the other is the evolutionary 
economics or the innovation system approach of system failure. The traditional 
rationale for technology policy has been that of market failure. Government can 
intervene to provide for public goods and to mitigate for externalities, barriers to 
entry, information asymmetries etc. However recent research demonstrates ways in 
which the factors shaping technological progress call for government measures to 
address system failure i.e. the lack of coherence among institutions within an 
innovation system. 
Following a review of the static efficiency market failure approaches to innovation 
and technology policy, the paper surveys various approaches to identify and describe 
system failures. System failures within an evolutionary framework may create low-
growth traps where the growth-generating evolutionary mechanisms themselves are 
impaired. Given the characteristics of the market system in an evolutionary 
framework, these failures in dynamic efficiency terms imply considerably enhanced 
challenges for the policy maker. 
Current trends in technology and innovation policies reflect the change in the 
perception of the rationale and effectiveness of government measures. The traditional 
core of technology policies has comprised interventions such as managing the 
science base and designing financial incentives to industrial R&D as solutions to 
market failures. This repertoire has been enhanced with instruments to overcome 
system failures such as promoting co-operation between firms, universities and 
government laboratories and changing the design of institutions and incentives 
(Andersson, 1998).  
Systemic evolutionary innovation implies that policy making itself becomes an 
adaptive and learning-based activity. The current standpoint of the OECD is that 
market and system failures are not mutually exclusive but that both require attention 
by policy makers. Each has its limitations and pitfalls. Market failure remains the 
basis for technology policies in many areas. At the same time factors shaping 
technological progress increasingly call for strategies that can cope with system 
failure and achieve coherence among underlying institutions and incentive structures. 
Government has a role to optimise the contributions of innovation and technology 
diffusion for the economy as a whole (OECD, 1998). 

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 1 
(FRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQ
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWKHVXSSO\RILQQRYDWLRQUHODWHG
VHUYLFHV
0DUNHWIDLOXUH
7KH$UURZ1HOVRQUDWLRQDOH
The basic economic justification for science and technology policies in the post-war 
period (in addition to the fulfilment of government and public needs such as defence, 
health and environment) has been a market failure argument. Markets may fail to 
operate efficiently for a variety of reasons including externalities, asymmetric 
information, economies of scale and scope, indivisibilities, barriers to entry etc.  
Innovation - the attainment of a competitive advantage over competitors - is basically 
about generating and using knowledge of what to produce and how to produce it. The 
question is then: Are there sufficiently efficient markets for such technical 
knowledge? Arrow (1962), see also Nelson (1959), gave the answer to this question: 
no, there are not such markets! Generation of such knowledge (the prime model 
being through R&D) by the market system is insufficient to achieve optimality. 
There are three basic factors that limit the attainment of a social optimum through 
private profit optimisation: 
• Outcomes of knowledge generating processes are XQFHUWDLQ. 
• Knowledge is a (quasi-) SXEOLFJRRG, implying inappropriability.  
• There are substantial LQGLYLVLELOLWLHV in knowledge generation. 
The Arrow-Nelson argument, which grew out of US policy debate in the 1950s on 
the role of federal S&T policies, has been widely used and further corroborated in the 
international S&T policy debate since then. The argument grew out of a debate that 
primarily questioned the role of the federal basic science enterprise (see Nelson 
1959), and was particularly attuned to strengthen the basis for an idea of a 'social 
contract' that arose in the aftermath of the Vannevar Bush report. A requisite for the 
argument for public intervention to hold, is an acceptance of science-based 
knowledge as being more or less directly productive, requiring not more than 
routinised transformation/interpretation from its generic, usually codified forms to 
the specific, mostly tacit, forms that are directly 'applicable' in productive activities. 
As a consequence there is no need for distinguishing between a science 
infrastructure, i.e. a science-based knowledge stock, and a stock of productive 
intangible assets comprising the industrial technology/competence/knowledge base. 
Underlying this interpretation is the microeconomic theory of the firm. This theory 
implies a particular interpretation of technical information and knowledge: such 
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knowledge is JHQHULF, FRGLILHG, LPPHGLDWHO\DFFHVVLEOH and GLUHFWO\SURGXFWLYH. 
Hence there is no difference between capabilities, knowledge and information. 
Technological knowledge and technological competences are in essence just the 
possesion of technical information. These properties are necessary conditions to 
attain optimality – allowing rational optimising behaviour by firms – and for a very 
simple reason. Any restrictions of these would violate the conditions for competitive 
behaviour. Here lies the first limitation of the rationale. By equating productive 
capabilities and information its foundation is at most limited to 'technological clubs', 
and then to applied rather than basic research - whereas the latter is what the 
rationale originally was developed for. For a discussion of this see Hauknes 1998b. 
The market failure rationale is in principle a strong rationale. It provides: 
• A general rationale (optimisation of social benefits);  
• A guide to policy action (a framework for assessing links between benefits 
and policy inputs including funding); and  
• A guide for determining optimal use of government expenditure (where; how 
much). 
 
The policy recommendation that follows from the Arrow-Nelson rationale implies 
that such socially beneficial knowledge generation (read R&D) should be publicly 
provided or subsidised. The implications of this classical market-failure rationale can 
best be summarised as follows. Create favourable IUDPHZRUNFRQGLWLRQVto facilitate 
the smooth and dynamic functioning of markets, e.g. through vigorous competition 
policy, smooth macroeconomic policy or regulatory reform and through enabling 
new markets for S&T products (as through patent regulation. Then correct essential 
market failures by public provision or subsidising private production of the S&T 
products. This proved a strong argument for public R&D policies from the late 1950s 
onwards. Its strength was achieved not the least as it complemented three trends and 
views in this period: 
• A 'production line' interpretation of R&D and innovation - the so-called 
OLQHDUPRGHO;  
• Economic growth and technical change were regarded as dominantly FDSLWDO
HPERGLHG- sophisticated capital equipment codifying productive knowledge; 
and  
• Advanced manufacturing and new industrial (techno-)structures were 
vanguard sectors - 
WHFKQRORJ\SXVK
. 
$SSURSULDWLRQRIUHWXUQVDQGXQFHUWDLQW\
The activities that foster technological advance and innovation, i.e. R&D, are 
primarily affected by two types of failures; imperfect appropriation of returns and 
uncertainty, which lead to underinvestment from society’s point of view in R&D 
carried out by firms (OECD, 1998). 
Market failure in relation to knowledge production and innovation means that the 
social rates of return from R&D is commonly higher than the private rates of return. 
(FRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQLQQRYDWLRQ
DQGWKHVXSSO\RILQQRYDWLRQUHODWHGVHUYLFHV
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This is because the innovator is able to appropriate only part of the gains with the 
rest accruing to consumers and/or competitors. Moreover many innovations 
contribute to further innovations without the original innovator receiving any reward. 
While such externalities or spill-overs increase the benefits from R&D the downside 
is that fewer resources are devoted to innovation activities than would be socially 
desirable (OECD, 1998, Pavitt 1991). 
Uncertainty is inherent to innovation. It is difficult to predict the cost and duration of 
a project and the commercial success of its outcome. Failures are common. Risk 
measures the possibilities that actual outcomes will deviate from the expected 
outcome. Society faces less risk than the individual firm and for each particular 
technological problem society cares only that at least one firm solves the problem 
and that at least one is successful in introducing the innovation into the market. 
Facing higher risk a private firm discounts future returns at a higher rate than does 
society. Therefore the private firm value future returns less, and from society’s 
perspective, will invest too little into R&D. Socially useful projects will accordingly 
be rejected. Further when the firms expected returns falls short of society’s expected 
return, the firm has less future returns to value than society does and again 
underinvestment in innovative activites will be the result (Link and Scott, 1998). 
Research has shown that in the majority of OECD countries, the social rate of return 
on investments in R&D and human capital largely exceeds the private rate of return 
(Mohnen, 1996). The argument about externalities is true in fields such as energy, 
the environment, infrastructure or large-scale innovation projects on the electronic 
highway. This argument is central to the discussion on publicly funded research in 
universities and public research institutes. Stimulating co-operation between firms 
and the public R&D infrastructure (universities, research institutes) may increase the 
social return on publicly funded R&D. More firms will be able to profit from public 
R&D efforts, potentially increasing in the diffusion of knowledge, particularly 
towards small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In most countries, SMEs have 
not yet been able to fully capture the benefits of increased external linkages and 
knowledge sharing. Many SMEs are unaware of the opportunities offered by co-
operation with other firms and knowledge institutes. 
Most countries show a variety of organisations conducting basic and/or applied R&D 
that are completely or partly financed by public funds. This fact has been explained 
with arguments that to a large extent refer to Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962).  The 
following list shows arguments that are repeatedly stated as rationale for State 
intervention in the generation of research (Dosi 1988, Pavitt 1991, Brooks 1994, 
Senker 1991, Faulkner and Senker 1994, Nelson 1996, Dasgupta and David 1994, 
Edquist 1999). 
• The public-good character of R&D and knowledge constitutes a lack of 
incentives to engage in private R&D. 
• Competitive regimes produce less basic research than desirable for the 
economy as a whole. 
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• Private investors tend to be risk-averse and will not invest in major 
technological advancements with an insecure outcome. 
• Companies' profit orientation leads to short-term innovation policies and 
neglects the long-term benefits of complex research programmes. 
• Benefits from basic research are difficult to appropriate.  
• Basic research shows economies of scale which would remain unexploited, if 
the research were carried out by individual firms. 
• Most small and medium-sized firms could not afford large R&D departments 
and are therefore not able to provide the technological basis for their 
innovation activities.  
• Basic research in publicly financed institutions has spillover effects that 
stimulate research in private companies. 
• The results of basic research should be available to the general public in order 
to guarantee the rapid diffusion of new technologies and thus to enhance 
technical progress in all industries concerned. 
• Secrecy in knowledge production due to private appropriation of research 
results hinders technology diffusion and the modernisation of the economy. 
Hence government funding of R&D seems to play a vital role for technological and 
economic development.The rationale for public involvement in knowledge 
production is that if let alone markets will underinvest in such activities due 
primarily to inadequate appropriability conditions and uncertainty. The policy 
implication is the removal of the sources to failure in order to create optimal 
conditions for the production of knowledge. The solutions offered to government are 
subsidising the activity (financial incentives to industrial R&D), providing suitable 
terms and duration of property rights (patents) and public knowledge production 
(managing the science base). The policies work by changing net marginal returns to 
developing technology in firms, thus increasing their R&D-activities (Lipsey, 1998). 
The policy maker acts as an optimising social planner aiming to improve the 
behaviour of firms by correcting imperfect initiatives (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 
1998).  
Edquist stresses the superiority of markets in economic activities and points out that 
markets have to have failed and that the state has to have the ability to solve the 
resulting problems to justify state intervention. The advantages of public actors in 
this context are that the state may use non-market mechanisms, and that state actions 
can improve the functioning of markets or create new markets (Edquist, 1999).
Although market failure provides a general rationale for policy intervention in 
knowledge production and innovation processes it is inherently imprecise in its 
detailed prescriptions. Theory tells us nothing about the optimal rate of R&D. Firms 
may spend too much or too little on innovation, they may innovate too quickly or too 
slowly, they may undertake excessively risky projects or be too conservative. The 
appropriate policy therefore depends on the specifics of the situation and requires the 
policy maker to have a detailed knowledge of what are necessarily conjectures held 
by firms (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998). One indicator of underinvestment in 
innovative activities often used by policy makers is the R&D-volume in firms, 
(FRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQLQQRYDWLRQ
DQGWKHVXSSO\RILQQRYDWLRQUHODWHGVHUYLFHV
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sectors and nations. A low R&D-volume in the nation compared to other nations is 
taken as an indication of under-investment.  
*RYHUQPHQWDVDSOD\HULQPDUNHWV
One increasingly used rationale for government action in the area of innovation can 
be construed as being classical in origin, and is that government itself is an important 
player in some markets. This provides an opportunity for governments to put 
pressure on the various market players to produce innovative solutions to societal 
problems. In some countries, technology procurement policies have been 
transformed into public procurement policies with a view to enhancing innovation. 
Driving such a change is the notion that without a demanding customer, able to pull 
innovations from start to finish, some innovative activity would not occur. The aim 
of these new-style government procurement policies is not to support national 
industries, but instead to challenge firms and groups of firms to develop innovative 
solutions. For government, this approach often means new ways of procurement, e.g. 
using different forms of contracting out or setting functional instead of detailed 
technical specifications during the tendering process. 
6\VWHPIDLOXUH
7KHQHHGIRUQHZUDWLRQDOHV
The strength of the neo-classical market-failure argument is its clarity. It suggests a 
simple criterion for judging when government intervention is appropriate. However it 
still has limitations in capturing the key elements of technological progress and thus 
has limits as a rationale and guide for technology policy making (OECD, 1998). 
Limitations of market failure analysis in regard to technological progress and 
innovation have been analysed in the 80s and 90s. The complexity of the process 
makes it difficult to identify and even to define market failure. Firstly it ignores the 
broader institutional framework that defines how markets work. Secondly it 
implicitly assumes that the market mechanisms have a competitive advantage over 
other mechanisms in all industrial technological and interface activities relevant for 
policy purposes. Lastly it may fail in providing direction and focus to policies when 
externalities are pervasive (Teubal, 1998). Absence of markets may rather be a 
strong signal that other coordinating mechanisms are more effective in terms of 
resource allocation, viz. networks, associations, communities a.o. (Nelson, 1987). 
Neo-classic economic analysis has not totally ignored the subject of technology. 
Rather an explicit examination of technology and of knowledge about technology has 
simply been suppressed by introducing certain assumptions into the theory of the 
firm. Central have been the assumptions of a given set of tastes and some given stock 
of technological knowledge. Given this knowledge of tastes and technology the firm 
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determines its optimal behaviour including the choice of technique through the 
explicit consideration of factor prices (Rosenberg, 1994).  
Is the Arrow-Nelson or market failure rationale sufficient as a basis for innovation 
policies? It is not. It involves a misrepresentation of what underlies the dynamics of 
advanced economies. Learning is active, interactive, collaborative and ongoing. 
Innovation is multi-organisational, multi-functional and systemic. These insights lead 
to the need of rethinking the basic arguments for the use of innovation policies and 
their objectives. 
Though still rudimentary, the understanding of systemic innovation has emphasised 
the importance of a resource based, evolutionary theory of the firm. Such models of 
the firm have as main aspects the role of non-price competition on markets, that 
firms rely in their activities on a wide range of techno-economic capabilities that 
must be essentially learned, the boundedness of the capabilities and rationalities that 
shape firm behaviour, leading to satisficing behaviour, a non-optimising form of 
behaviour. Such arguments lead on to the role of evolution and selection in shaping 
economic change, and to structures innovation patterns, to innovation regimes and 
trajectories. 
With this approach to economic change, capitalist systems are economic systems 
where variety generation and adaptation are basic ingredients, and where innovation 
on the one hand and diffusion  on the other – are complementary processes. The 
diffusion process is in itself a process of continual adoption, adaptation and 
reorientation by firms, of innovation; innovation and diffusion turns a Janus face 
towards us. The processes of change in economic systems are processes that are 
crucially linked to heterogeneity, to 'bootstrapping' of economic growth and to 
structural change. In contrast to the market failure framework that allow use of the 
welfare theorems, the inefficiency related to knowledge generation is not limited to 
separated markets, it is a feature affecting all markets. In a sense the situation may be 
characterised by saying that all is market failure.  
That relations between actors and hence co-ordination of production activities in any 
economic system involve two dual and concomitant processes, flows of economic 
resources in transaction and production processes and transformation and transmittal 
of information that shape co-ordination and behaviour, is an integral part of our 
understanding of economic systems. The last decades have shown increased attention 
to the complexity and important role of the latter process in shaping economic 
development. Though our understanding of the why's and how's of these processes 
and their relations are still lacking, our understanding of them is substantially 
improved. The notion of information as public good has increasingly been turned 
around by the realisation that the functionalities of bridging between the two, which 
necessarily involves interpretation of externally acquired information, indeed gives 
information properties of (at least partial) excludability and rivalry.  
In evolutionary economic theories technology change and innovation is the most 
important factor behind economic evolution. The study of how technology advances 
(FRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQLQQRYDWLRQ
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and its driving forces and consequences is at the center of evolutionary analysis. 
Technological change is presented as a two-stage process: one stage for generating 
variety in technology (innovations) and one stage for selecting across that variety to 
produce patterns of change (diffusion of innovations). There is also a third stage, 
namely feedback from the selection process to the development of further variation. 
If an evolutionary perspective is applied to the traditional sources of market failure, 
the analysis changes in subtle but important ways. Far from constituting failures, 
asymmetric information is essential if the competitive process is to work in an 
evolutionary fashion. Without asymmetry there can be neither novelty nor variety. 
Spillovers only make sense in a world where firms are fundamentally differentiated 
with respect to what they know (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998). 
Technological advance and innovation is characterised by constant interplay and 
mutual learning between different types of knowledge and actors. Technological 
change can be seen as a learning process, which is gradual and cumulative in 
character and leads to a relatively ordered pattern of innovations (technology 
trajectories). Firms build upon their existing knowledge base when they search for 
new innovation opportunities, but they also use external sources of knowledge in this 
search (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998, Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). Overall 
performance is thus not only dependent on how specific actors perform but also on 
how they interact with each other as elements of an innovation system. This division 
of labour in the generation of innovations means that no firm can be self-sufficient in 
regard to knowledge and thus gains from linkages with other knowledge generating 
organisations. Through their innovative activities firms establish relations with other 
organisations such as other firms, universities and R&D-institutes. If these market 
and non-market organisations interact poorly, technology change may be slowed. 
Mismatches between elements in an innovation system are by OECD defined as 
systemic failures. If systemic failure exists then there is a rationale for policy 
intervention aiming at accelerating the rate of technological advance and innovation 
(OECD, 1998). 
It is however right to say that the improvement in understanding of innovation in 
market systems has not been paralleled by development of the basic rationales of 
policy formulation and intervention. There has, however, over the last years been 
prominent attempts to raise issues and formulate some of the questions involved. The 
aim of what follows is not to give a review of these developments but to raise some 
aspects that are shared by these and conclusions as to the policy making process. The 
prime shared aspect of these approaches, that is in fact shared by all known 
approaches to innovation analysis, is the acceptance of the significance of beneficial 
externalities of technical knowledge, and the importance of innovation as a 
determinant of economic growth and welfare development. As phrased by Bengt-
Åke Lundvall recently, “Innovation is at the core of the competitiveness of firms, 
regions and nations” (Lundvall 1998).  
The recognition of innovation as a process involving many actors and taking place in 
a complex institutional system is the basis of system failure rationales for policy; a 
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policy that focuses on promoting the generation of innovations. The innovation 
processes are influenced not only by market forces but also by the character of the 
entire innovation system. Thus system rationales give justification for going beyond 
remedying market failures (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). According to these 
rationales policies should try to alter the structural conditions under which 
technology advance and innovations occurs rather than just as in the market failure 
rationale altering the cost and pay off associated with R&D. 
6\VWHPEDVHGUDWLRQDOHV
The system failure rationales for public intervention make a case for innovation 
policies. Policies that in all important aspects are about facilitation, i.e. facilitating 
the emergence of new technology and innovation opportunities by building an 
innovation infrastructure (Lipsey, 1998, Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998). Innovation 
policies include the policy domains of education, science, technology, labour market 
and industry. Policy becomes a much more complex issue than in the market failure 
rationale. It should design and create an institutional structure that supports the 
innovation processes in firms. The focus is on enhancing the innovative possibilities 
of firms by improving their access to knowledge. 
System failure rationales do not preclude such policy instruments as intellectual 
property rights and R&D subsidies per se. Rather they provide a rationale for 
additional domains of policy intervention (Lipsey, 1998, OECD, 1998).  The need to 
encourage technology advance through policies can be thought of as a response to 
market failure. Markets fail when they do not lead to some desirable and attainable 
state of technology. In a system perspective the market constitutes only one element 
in the context of innovation and diffusion. Institutions and networks are other 
constituting elements and their functioning also influence the process of technology 
advance. There is a need for government to respond to externalities as in the market 
failure approach but in addition also to alter the structural conditions under which 
technology advance occur. In the market failure approach the technological 
capabilities in firms within an existing technology is increased by changing the net 
marginal returns to technological development. In the system failure approach the 
technology possibilities that firms faces are enhanced by improving their access to 
knowledge (Lipsey, 1998). 
What then are the instruments that government can use to overcome system failure 
and increase the rate of innovation? In order to answer that question it is first 
necessary to distinguish between different types of system failures.  
’LIIHUHQWW\SHVRIV\VWHPIDLOXUHV
Evolutionary ’traps’ or failures are low-growth traps where ’the unfolding of an 
evolutionary process and a high rate of innovation and diffusion’ is impaired 
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(Malerba 1998). Malerba identifies four main types of failures, which he describes as 
follows, 
• /HDUQLQJIDLOXUHVfirms or industries may not be able to learn rapidly and 
effectively and may be locked into existing technologies, thus being unable to 
jump to the new technologies.  
• ([SORUDWLRQH[SORLWDWLRQDQGYDULHW\VHOHFWLRQWUDGHRIIV: industries may be 
characterized by a lot of variety generation with weak selection processes or by 
tough selection with little variety generation. Tough selection may rapidly kill off 
variety, experimentation and competition quite soon and lead the system in a 
“one-view” situation On the contrary, weak selection processes may allow the 
persistency of too much experimentation and too many inefficient firms, thus 
blocking the exploitation of technologies. Similarly, firms may do a lot of 
exploration and experimentation, but without exploiting what has been 
discovered. On the opposite, firms may be engaged into a lot of exploitation, 
modifications and incremental innovations, without exploration and 
experimentation.  
• $SSURSULDELOLW\WUDSV: too stringent appropriability may greatly limit the diffusion 
of advanced technological knowledge and eventually block the development of 
differentiated technological capabilities within an industry.  
• ’\QDPLFFRPSOHPHQWDULWLHVIDLOXUHV: the appropriate dynamic complementarities 
required for successful and sustained innovative activities may not be present 
within an industry or an innovation system or, when they are present, they may 
not be connected, so that the positive effects from complementarities may not 
take place. (Malerba 1998) 
 
While the market failure approach refers to intervention towards specific missing or 
inefficient markets, Malerba's evolutionary failures refer to the mismatches and traps 
in the evolutionary mechanisms themselves. 
Keith Smith (1998) identifies four types of system failures: 
• )DLOXUHVLQLQIUDVWUXFWXUDOSURYLVLRQDQGLQYHVWPHQWInfrastructures have a 
number of specific technical characteristics which lead to serious problems of 
investment appraisal, Smith (1997). This is a serious problem, since studies of the 
nature of industry knowledge bases, indicate an important role in enabling and 
structuring technological opportunities of firms for knowledges developed within 
these kinds of infrastructures. The provision and design of infastructures, and 
policy makers’ capabilities to do so, indicate a substantial role for public sector 
support. This entire area is problematic at the present time, since increasing 
pressures on public expenditure in most EU countries have led to strategies of 
privatization and/or marketization which have serious implications for 
infrastructural operations. 
• µ7UDQVLWLRQIDLOXUHV¶Any innovation-based theory of the economic process must 
stress transitions and dynamics; particularly systems theories which stress the 
pervasiveness of innovation. But firms - and especially small firms - are 
necessarily quite limited in their technological horizons. Systems approaches 
imply serious problems for firms and sectors in adapting to transitions. Firstly, 
even in the normal course of innovative activity it is almost certain that firms will 
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frequently encounter technological problems outside their existing capabilities. 
Secondly, there may be changes in technological opportunities or demand 
patterns which push the market into new areas of technology. These transitions 
can be particularly difficult since they often imply completely new generic 
technologies, with relevant outside the existing structure of capabilities.  
• /RFNLQIDLOXUHVSystem or network externalities and technologies being closely 
linked to their social and economic environment means that technological 
alternatives must compete not only with components of an existing technology, 
but with the overall system in which it is embedded. Technological regimes 
persist. The socio-economic system can be "locked-in" to particular technological 
paradigms. This lead to serious problems of lock-in. Such paradigms are complex 
systems of integrated technologies. This is an important rationale for public 
action in a systems context. 
• ,QVWLWXWLRQDOIDLOXUHVSystems approaches emphasize the institutional context as 
a defining and structuring element in the system. This includes regulatory 
frameworks, technical standards, risk-management rules, health and safety 
regulations, as well as wider context of political culture and social values. These 
institutional/regulatory processes may develop through conscious choice or 
through the evolution of cooperation, but invariably discussed and implemented 
through policy agencies. The need for monitoring and assessment of regulatory 
performance, and if necessary changes in regulatory systems, provides a rationale 
therefore for public action.
Carlsson and Jacobsson (1997) divide system failures into: 
• Network failures 
• Institutional failures 
1HWZRUNV partly compensate for limitations in a firm’s search space and improve a 
firm’s resource base and degree of freedom. The connectivity of the organisations in 
a system matter and a well-functioning system with positive and reciprocal external 
economies between actors results in a common vision of future technology advance. 
This means a reduction of perceived risks and co-ordination of investments among 
independent organisations. Networks do not necessarily grow spontaneously and 
there may be obstacles to the growth of a collective identity and shared technological 
vision. Network failures means that organisations in a system interact poorly and that 
this leads to a lack of a collective vision of future technology expectations and co-
ordination of investment. Such a vision is created by good connectivity i.e. reciprocal 
flows of information and knowledge, which ties together actors in the system 
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).  
In relation to network failure the building of bridges between organisations for 
mutual accumulation of knowledge is an important policy area. In this aspect of 
system failure innovation policy is about facilitating the emergence of new 
innovative opportunities by building connections between firms and the knowledge 
base. Such networking policies usually focus on improving the relations between 
firms and universities/research laboratories i.e. integrates the R&D-activities of these 
actors. Establishing and intensifying connections involve a range of policy 
instruments such as joint R&D-programmes, programmes for increasing the mobility 
of persons. The policy task is to increase the number and intensity of linkages among 
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firms, among firms and R&D-organisations. The linking together of organisations 
that has had little or no contact with each other are especially important. The result of 
a strong connectivity is the creation of a common vision among actors of future 
direction of innovations and technology advance. Publicly managed technology 
foresight exercises are an instrument for formulating a common technology vision. 
R&D grants for co-operation projects, which are combined with foresight activities, 
are another way to establish R&D-co-operation and a common base for future 
activities  (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998, Lipsey, 1998). 
,QVWLWXWLRQV in the innovation system approach are of two types. Organisations are 
characterised as KDUGLQVWLWXWLRQVlaws, regulations, culture, attitudes etc are 
characterised as VRIWLQVWLWXWLRQV. Firms are the prime agents in innovation systems. 
They develop and introduce innovations in the market. Universities are also 
important players by fostering a high technological competence and variety in 
innovation by pursuing high-risk research as well as education. Other hard 
institutions are those performing bridging roles within a system such as public R&D-
institutes. Soft institutions are important in innovation processes in many ways e.g. 
by influencing the willingness to share resources with other actors and by influencing 
the entrepreneurial spirit. Institutional failures mean that some organisations in the 
system are lacking or performing poorly or that laws, regulations etc. hamper 
interaction and the entrepreneurial spirit (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). 
Important public organisations in relation to institutional failure are those who 
design, formulate and implement policy initiatives, those who perform research and 
development (universities and R&D-institutes), those who support diffusion of 
knowledge and innovations (bridging organisations), regulatory agencies, standard 
setting agencies and patent offices. The behaviour of these organisations must be 
conducive to innovations in firms and their behaviour can be influenced by 
government regulations and laws, e.g. rules for universities and public R&D-
institutes (Edqvist and Johnson, 1997) 
A central responsibility for government is to build strong and flexible education and 
research organisations i.e. universities and public R&D-institutes which can identify 
new technology and shape awareness of these among firms, exploit new technology 
by spin-offs, increase absorption capacity by accelerating education and research in 
new technology areas. These organisations must be characterised by flexibility in 
expansion of research and education in new fields. Decision-making systems and 
incentive structures should be designed to make it easy and fast to change into new 
fields and expand research and education. The important tasks of fostering firms 
awareness of new technology opportunities, monitoring technology development and 
disseminate the information to enhance the opportunity set can also be performed by 
government agencies and programs (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). 
Policy can alter soft institutions, e.g. laws and regulations, to assist necessary 
adjustments in an innovation system. Areas of importance for policy are assuring free 
entry of new firms into markets, stimulating entrepreneurship in new technology-
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based firms, assuring the supply of venture capital (venture capital supply funds, 
absorbs risk and provide management competence). Especially important in regard to 
innovation is to remove obstacles to the growth of venture capital by tax changes and 
legislation changes. (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997). 
Given the strong path-dependence of technology and innovation and the powerful 
market mechanism that weed out most new initiatives an important area for public 
policy is to build institutions which sustain and increase variety in innovation. 
Variety is necessary for long-term stability of economic growth. The most important 
vehicle for variety is free entry of new firms into markets. A special form is the 
formation of new technology based firms through spin-offs from existing firms, 
universities or R&D-institutes building upon and utilising knowledge which 
otherwise may not have been commercially exploited. The frequency of spin-offs 
and the evolution of these firms depends on a range of factors outside of the 
individuals starting the firm, factors that can be influenced by policy, e.g. the 
functioning of the venture capital market and conditions for commercialising 
academic research results (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).
What all these approaches have in common is the opening up for much richer, and 
more difficult, innovation policies. We may describe the characteristic aspects of 
innovation policies that are based on understanding of systemic innovation in five 
core theses: 
• Innovations are firm-based activities. 
• Innovation requires substantial integration of factors and activities in firms, as 
development of competencies and capabilities, product development, market 
understanding and insight, design, organisation, etc. 
• The variety in firms' prerequisites and abilities for innovative activities is 
large, even within functionally homogenous groups of firms. 
• Innovation involves a dynamic interaction between firms and their business 
environment, involving customers, suppliers and competitors, as well as 
R&D institutions, advisory and diffusion organisations, industrial networks 
and organisations, provision of financial and other business services, 
regulation, etc. 
• Innovation is contingent to a framework that is substantially shaped and 
organised through public policies, as physical and immaterial infrastructures, 
regulation and legislation, fiscal systems, public funding and programmes, as 
well as education and R&D policies. 
The approaches to system failures described above implies that with these organising 
theses for formulation of innovation policies the main focus should be on the shaping 
of (technological) variety generating and selection mechanisms that underlies the 
basic structures of innovation systems. 
%DODQFLQJV\VWHPV([LVWLQJV\VWHPVDQGQHZV\VWHPV
In the innovation system literature an important distinction is made between existing 
and new systems. There are two possible directions for public policy, namely 
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strengthening existing systems and creating new systems. The most important but 
also most difficult task is to promote the creation of new systems. The issues are how 
to influence the receiver competence of the actors, the connectivity and network 
formation and how to influence the creation and maintenance of variety (Carlsson 
and Jacobsson, 1997) 
The receiver competence of firms determines their ability to exploit new technology 
opportunities and is raised by R&D, hiring of competent personnel, training of 
personnel and accumulation of experience. The possibilities of public influence lies 
in the educational sector and university R&D, but also in the opportunities of 
creating positive externalities through various forms of spillovers. The universities 
influence receiver competence by identifying new emerging technologies and 
shaping an awareness of their potential, they are the base for spin-offs that exploit 
new technology and they increase the competence by accelerating research and 
education in these technologies. The main public responsibility is to ensure that 
education and research is characterised by an early expansion into new fields 
(Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).  
The key players in the formation of a new technology system are so called prime 
movers. They raise awareness, undertake investment in the new technology, give 
legitimacy and diffuse it through various mechanisms to other actors. The issue of 
who the prime movers are and under what conditions they perform these functions 
are crucial for policy makers. A key issue is to create conditions and institutions 
conducive to monitoring the international scene and to encourage the establishment 
of prime movers and to promote strong links to other actors. Government can 
influence the emergence of prime movers by foster industry awareness of new 
technology opportunities. Monitoring technology developments around the world, 
identifying the technology frontier and disseminate the information are important 
functions in large multinational firms. However these activities can be supplemented 
and enhanced through public agencies i.e. expand the perceived opportunity set. (E.g. 
programs for establishing links between research and potential users to make them 
aware of new opportunities). Moreover advanced public procurement policies can 
ensure that the prospective prime movers undertake the necessary investments in the 
new technology. A competent buyer should specify price, performance and 
contribute to product design. By paying for the sellers R&D it reduces the risks of 
venturing into new technology. Government can also co-ordinate private demand for 
new technology when it is poorly articulated and fragmented. (Carlsson and 
Jacobsson, 1997). 
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7KHUHLVQRRSWLPDOSXEOLFSROLF\
’LVWULEXWLRQZLWKLQDIUDPHZRUNRUFKDQJHVLQWKHIUDPHZRUNV
WKHPVHOYHV"
In neo-classical (’contractualist’) models of the economy, technological change 
processes appear as intermittent processes, sudden (instantaneous) bursts of change 
affecting all economic agents alike. In this framework there is thus no (transient-
creating) technological competition. All firms are at any time on the same production 
technology, using the same behavioural rules. 
In contrast to this approach, evolutionary approaches to innovation-led economic 
change emphasise variety in firm behaviour, that firms are different is a basic 
ingredient in these approaches. The factor that is neglected in the traditional, ’neo-
classical’ approach is argued to be of central importance. Why this change of 
emphasis? The basic point here is that WKHPDLQIRFXVRIHFRQRPLFDQDO\VLVKDVEHHQ
IXQGDPHQWDOO\FKDQJHG. The main focus is no longer on distributional characteristics 
of economic systems, within given framework conditions (often expressed as ’given 
technology’), but rather on how economic agents contribute themselves to change 
these framework conditions; the attempts are to endogenise technical change. There 
is a fundamental shift from consideration of static to dynamic efficiency of market 
systems. Those who adopt this view generally argue that technical change amenable 
to endogenisation, with a concomitant extension of the ’economic’ system to an 
’innovation’ system, is the consequence of an evolutionary process. Metcalfe (1998) 
gives an outline of such evolutionary approaches to economic change. The 
evolutionary process is based firstly on the generation of behavioural variety at firm 
level (’innovations’) through deliberate interactive searching/learning activities, a 
variety that arises as firms respond to composite price and technological market 
competition characteristics, through formation of expectations of what fits these 
characteristics. These learning processes, the expectations and techno-economic 
choices are necessarily contingent factors on the firms’ existing capabilities and 
socio-economic environment.  
Secondly behavioural patterns, i.e. innovations, are exposed to a selection process as 
a consequence of the market competition, viz. the ’markets select surviving 
behavioural patterns’. The selection process thereby changes the information and 
learning generating environment of firms. That firms differ in exposure to (through 
localised and finite-time diffusion, hence local, bounded horizons) and ability to 
accommodate new information has one important consequence. The game of 
economic competition changes character from unique sets of optimal behaviour, 
from perfect rationality, to optimalisation that is contingent on local (technological, 
geographical, social) characteristics, to bounded rationality. In most cases this 
implies that the selectivity of the competition is blunt. Not only does it cause 
existence of complementary ’species’ of firms, within any single specie the 
competition allows co-existence of a variety of firms. In the next round this will also 
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change the characteristics of the selection process; firms do not just have to update to 
new information, through these stages the rules of the game change as well. 
7KHVRFLDOSODQQHUDQGWKHVRFLDODGDSWRU–1HZUROHVIRUWKHSROLF\
PDNHU
Endogenous and systemic innovation and technical change, implies that there is no 
longer any well-defined optimum allocation of resources. Hence, there is no single, 
optimal public policy. Rule based policies as follows from the market failure 
approach are not any longer viable. Current trends in technology and innovation 
policies reflect change in the perception of the rationale and effectiveness of 
government measures. These trends involve a shift from the traditional core of 
technology policies such as managing the science base and financial incentives to 
industrial R&D, to more novel realms such as facilitating growth in new demand, 
designing an institutional framework for consistent formulation and implementation 
of policy. The trend towards collaborative work, foresight analysis and the creation 
of specialist bridging institutions are supportive of the system perspective. There is a 
shift in emphasis from subsidies of firm level R&D or similar activities to developing 
appropriate framework conditions for firm-level innovation performance, to 
generation of an appropriate infrastructure for innovation and diffusion performance 
and incentives. The objectives of such policies towards technological infrastructures 
includes enabling firms to exploit existing innovation opportunities, and to enhance 
their innovation opportunities. 
This policy shift means a change from the optimising policy maker to the adaptive 
policy maker. Policy is no longer only about correcting imperfect incentives for 
private agents but rather about facilitating the emergence of new opportunities by 
building innovation infrastructure. Since policy making cannot be optimising, it 
follows that there is no room available for any variant of the social planner. The 
emphasis of adaptive policy making is upon co-ordination of actions leading to 
innovation by non-market methods recognising that once innovations occur they will 
be co-ordinated by the market process. These policies are to a large extent trial and 
error experiments. Policy experimenting and formulation must be based on a mixture 
of theory (important variables), measurement (indicators, benchmarking) and 
subjective judgement. Hence if the policy maker is to learn and adapt, emphasis must 
be given to evaluation of these policies (Metcalfe and Georghiou, 1998). Theory and 
benchmarking help develop informed judgements about areas in which the chances 
of useful intervention are relatively high and empirical analysis can identify the 
nature of failure.  
Governments should be guided by common core principles regarding the policy 
rationale for intervention. The market failure rationale point to the fact that at any 
stage of economic development there are invariant common principles to which 
government in market economies should adhere. The system failures provide 
complementary guidance to address the implications of the evolutionary nature of 
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technology and innovation policy. Such rationales require an attempt to understand 
and gauge the interplay between a range of issues and mechanisms, which by 
definition will be country specific. Experience gained in pursuing principles of 
market failures is readily transferable across countries but in the systemic approach it 
is much more difficult to draw lessons from experiences of others (OECD, 1998). 
Thus, the guidelines deduced from theory do not always translate into similar 
priorities and instruments depending on country-specific institutional features 
(Lipsey, 1998). The role of a particular institution in the innovation process can 
differ between countries. R&D-institutes are important in some countries but not in 
others. Legal systems, rules, norms, values also differ. Comparisons of national 
innovation systems are important for the identification of system failures but it is 
necessary to understand how different innovation systems work in order to 
understand how a specific initiatives influence the innovation process (Metcalfe and 
Georghiou, 1998, Edqvist, 1997). 
The international dimension reduces the reach of national comparisons and the scope 
for national innovation policy. The challenge for policy is to put in place conditions 
that allow for complementarity between increased internationalisation in knowledge 
flows and domestic innovation capacity. In practice it is neither possible nor 
desirable to prescribe any single general strategy for maintaining or attracting 
innovative production capabilities. Countries differ with respect to competitive 
advantages as well as their possession of favourable assets or conditions, which are 
attractive (Andersson, 1998). 
An important aspect of the system approach is the emphasis put upon how to create 
an appropriate institutional setting for policy formulation, implementation and 
evaluation. Common core principles for policy do translate into different priorities 
and instruments. The innovation system approach requires an understanding the 
interplay between a range of issues and mechanisms, which are country specific. 
This means that it is difficult to draw lessons from experiences of others and that no 
single policy can be prescribed. Thus it is necessary to involve all stakeholders in the 
formulation and implementation of public initiatives. The system approach requires 
co-ordination mechanisms between ministries and between ministries and other 
public agencies and between them and other stakeholders. Government initiatives 
must be co-ordinated and instruments should be made conditional on the 
implementation of acceptable evaluation practices to check against government 
failure and to encourage the policy learning process (Andersson, 1998). 
As policy initiatives are trial and error experiments, their evaluation is essential in 
order to check for government failure and for policy learning purposes (Metcalfe and 
Georghiou, 1998, Lipsey, 1998). Equally important is the use of wider theoretical 
and empirical analysis as a basis for adaptive policy making. Policy learning must be 
an integrated part of the policy making process. The policy shift outlined above 
changes and increases rather fundamentally the requisite policy capabilities and 
competencies of policy makers, Smith (1998). But what then is non-optimising, 
adaptive and learning-based policy making? And how can effective learning be 
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encouraged? What does the ‘innovation system’ of policy makers look like? These 
are questions that still are open and which will be addressed as part of the RISE 
project. 
3ROLF\DQGWKHVXSSO\RILQQRYDWLRQUHODWHGVHUYLFHV
,QWURGXFWLRQ
The economic rationale for public intervention in the generation of knowledge and in 
the innovation process is a failure of the market or the innovation system. Market 
failure means underinvestment in R&D-activities, while system failure means 
underdevelopment of innovations. As we have seen provision of RTO services by 
public agencies or publicly funded R&D institutions is one of the main mechanisms 
for public policies to address relevant market failures. In fact this rationale has 
proved a strong driver for the development of national RTD systems in the post-war 
period. A central question is then; does the argument that market failure rationales 
are misguided also imply that these policy developments were equally misguided? 
Are there any rationales and guidelines for public involvement in the provision of 
RTO and similar innovation-related services? It is evident from the preceding 
discussion that innovation-related services are vital elements in the innovation 
process. Providers of such services are universities, government laboratories and 
joint public/private R&D-institutes as well as private firms. So evidently there are 
system rationales for public provision of such services, though it is equally clear that 
they will not be as simple as in a market failure framework. 
0DUNHWIDLOXUHUDWLRQDOH
In the market failure rationale to government intervention the issue is whether there 
is an underinvestment in those R&D activities that generates innovation-related 
services. If a failure is the case the question is how government should act in order to 
remove the failure. If private firms provide the services and there is a positive 
externality associated with non-rivalrous technological knowledge then it is 
appropriate to offer general assistance. The policy prescription can be either to 
lowering the cost of generating new knowledge or raising the payoff to that 
knowledge. The policy instruments according to this rationale are more embracing 
and more enforceable patents that give more returns to innovators and direct support 
for R&D in the form of subsidies or tax relief that lower the costs (Mowery and 
Ziedonis, 1998). However, private firms are not the only suppliers of innovation-
related services. Public and semi-public R&D-organisations also provide such 
services.  
The empirical validity of arguments for public research funding has been tested in 
several contexts (Nelson 1986, Acs et al. 1992, Mansfield 1991, Mansfield 1995, 
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Senker 1991, Faulkner and Senker 1994, Pavitt 1991, Nelson and Rosenberg 1994, 
Beise and Stahl 1998). The general result of all studies was that research conducted 
in Research and Technology Organisations (RTOs) did have positive effects on 
companies’ innovativeness and that thus public funding was justified. However, the 
studies differ with respect to the most important features of research from which 
private firms could benefit and with respect to efficient channels of knowledge 
transfer. Beise and Stahl (using the same method as Mansfield, 1991) conclude that 
only a certain type of RTO (Fraunhofer Institutes) has a significant impact on 
company performance (Beise and Stahl, 1998). The most important reason for public 
spending is the training in research skills, which happens in public RTOs. For private 
firms the incentive to engage in training is small, because they will not benefit from 
it when researchers move on to another company.  
Subsidising R&D-activities and thereby changing the marginal returns is only 
applicable to private firms. Patents are applicable to all knowledge producing 
organisations. To the public suppliers, especially universities, the question is whether 
the possibility to patenting knowledge is a suitable instrument for increasing their 
R&D and output of services.  Richard Nelson argues that basic research produces 
essentially public goods for which the creation of private property rights is 
undesirable since the results of basic science can improve the productivity of applied 
research efforts. He further argues that the applied research efforts of both private 
and public organisations also produce important generic knowledge, as information 
on materials properties or standards, manufacturing process know-how and basic 
scientific research findings that underpin technological innovations in many sectors. 
This knowledge is best kept in the public domain, because it aids and accelerates the 
innovation process. Pricing the results of these activities is thus socially inefficient 
(Mowery and Ziedonis, 1998).  
The use of patents as a policy instrument for universities and other public R&D-
organisations is a way of making them more responsive to industrial needs and 
changing the direction of activities than increasing research per se. Recent 
experiments in the US science and technology policy have relied on the creation of 
markets in intellectual property to encourage technological commercialisation and 
inter-organisational interactions. The key question is whether the instrument 
employed for promotion of these collaborations is appropriate. The emphasis on the 
creation of markets for intellectual property paradoxically may discourage or impede 
some desirable forms of interaction. This policy also raises hazards for the 
universities that it seeks to influence. The universities may be too responsive to such 
incentives and thus impair their research and training roles. This policy has a narrow 
view of the channels through which universities interact with industry and effect the 
innovation process. They may lead to one channel being favoured at the expense of 
others and thereby diminish positive spillovers and thus in the long run impede 
technology advance (Mowery and Ziedonis, 1998). 
According to this rationale government involvement in the supply of innovation-
related services is only justified when a market-failure exist. Government should 
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supply services that can be characterised as public goods. To the extent that they are 
not public goods government should support the private providers by subsidising 
their R&D or by providing suitable property rights. The balance between public and 
private providers of innovation-related services, seen as innovation intermediaries, is 
dependent on the character of the services and it is an empirical task to identify 
which services are public goods and which are not. Thus, before formulating a policy 
to overcome the barriers that lead to market-failure it is necessary to determine 
whether market failure exists, to identify the nature of the market-failure and to 
analyse the effects of different instruments. Evaluations of the implemented policy 
are also imperative and the issue is if the intervention has led to increased activity. 
6\VWHPIDLOXUHUDWLRQDOH
In the system failure rationale the justification of government intervention is based in 
the working of the innovation system. The issues are whether the appropriate 
institutions of the innovation system are at place and if the connectivity between 
actors is satisfactory. The policy instruments to be used depend on the kind of failure 
that exists.  
From the point of view of the producers of innovations innovation-related services 
are knowledge inputs in the process of developing an innovation. These services can 
be generated in different types of organisations, such as universities, government 
laboratories, joint public/private institutes and private firms. These organisations 
have different goals and work under different conditions. Research in universities 
generates knowledge that can be transferred as services to firms and used in their 
innovation processes. This knowledge can also serve as a starting point for service 
innovations in existing firms or for spin-off firms. Universities also produce trained 
personnel that can be hired by firms and make contributions in their innovation 
processes. Government laboratories and semi-public R&D-institutes contribute to 
innovation processes in similar ways, supplying innovation services to the firms that 
develop innovations. Public R&D organisations don’t work under the same 
conditions as does private firms that supply services to innovators. Firms carry out 
their activities under market-conditions. This means that the possibilities for 
government to influence the supply of innovation-related services differ between the 
different types of suppliers. Public universities and government laboratories are 
under the control of government as are to some degree semi-public institutes. Firms 
however are not. This means that the instruments open to government varies.  
What then can governments do in relation to innovation-related services and their 
producers when system failures are acknowledged? For example, if there is an 
institutional failure certain instruments can be used and if there is a network failure 
other instruments are needed. Failures in VRIWLQVWLWXWLRQVcan mean that government 
has to change laws and regulations that influence the suppliers and users of these 
services. Failures in KDUGLQVWLWXWLRQVcan require changing in the working conditions 
of universities and government laboratories as well as establishing new public R&D-
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organisations or supporting the emergence of new firms. Remedying QHWZRUNIDLOXUHV
require other instruments. This failure means that a common vision of future 
technology advance among the actors of the system is lacking. Such a vision 
presupposes intense connections and collaboration between the actors. Government 
can increase the linkages by establishing bridging instruments of different kinds (e.g. 
R&D-programmes involving different types of actors with partial public funding), 
change the rules for universities and government labs in order to increase co-
operation with firms, manage technology foresight activities and so on. 
The system failure rationale focuses on actors in an innovation system and their 
interaction. The function of supplying innovation-related services to innovators can 
be carried out by public or private organisations. If any best balance between these 
types of organisations exists it is not possible to deduce it from theory. If suppliers of 
certain services are lacking government should try to “create” such organisations. 
The public good argument of the market failure rationale can be used to decide 
whether they should be private or public. 
The system failure approach to public policy also raises the question of what system 
to intervene in? The concept of innovation systems can be used at different levels of 
aggregation: national, regional or local and defined by different criteria: industrial or 
technological. At the national level some of the elements that constitutes the system 
are found that don’t differ between systems e.g. institutions such as laws, culture and 
attitudes to business. In relation to innovation-related services the most appropriate 
level of government intervention is one where linkages exists between producers of 
these services and their users i.e. industrial or technological systems of innovations.  
As in the case of market failure rationale the system failure rationale to government 
intervention in the supply of innovation-related services presupposes the 
identification of the nature of the failure before formulating a policy to overcome the 
barriers that leads to failure. In this rationale to government involvement the 
recommended methods of identifying failures are the use of benchmarking and best 
practice. The areas to be compare and assessed in these activities can be deduced 
from theory of national innovation systems. It is important to stress the necessity of 
empirical analysis of whether failures exist within specific areas if the benchmarking 
process indicates a failure. Questions to be addressed in such studies are: 
• What are the sources and content of innovation-related services in the client 
industries 
• Are the client industries underutilising innovation-related services 
• What is the nature of the failure that leads to underutilisation by clients 
When the nature of the failures have been identified they can serve as a guidelines 
for formulating measures to overcome the failure. But there are many instruments 
open to government in trying to remedy different kinds of failures. It is therefore 
necessary to involve the stakeholders in the process of design of public initiatives. It 
is also important in regard to government failure and for policy learning purposes to 
evaluate implemented policies. 
(FRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHVRIJRYHUQPHQWLQYROYHPHQWLQLQQRYDWLRQ
DQGWKHVXSSO\RILQQRYDWLRQUHODWHGVHUYLFHV
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&RQFOXVLRQV
This paper has dealt with the question of the economic rationale to government 
involvement in innovation and innovation-related services. Two theoretical 
approaches and rationales have been presented. One is the neo-classical approach of 
market failure and the other is the evolutionary and innovation system approach of 
system failure. The first approach is the traditional rationale for intervention and the 
latter is newer. The two rationales have different implication for what policy can and 
should do in relation to innovation and innovation-related services. Both rationales 
give justification for government involvement in the supply of innovation-related 
services but in different ways and they prescribe different policy instruments. 
However, market and systematic failures are not mutually exclusive, both require the 
attention of policy makers. Each approach has its limitations and pitfalls and missing 
out on one of them is likely to hamper effective policy-making. 
The policy implications in relation to innovation of market failure are that 
government can increase R&D in firms by changing their incentives to carry out 
R&D by subsidies and extended property rights of knowledge (i.e. creating a market 
for knowledge). This increase the net marginal returns to R&D. Government can also 
provide R&D by activities in public organisations i.e. universities and R&D-
institutes. The policy implications of system failure are that government can design 
an institutional system that facilitates innovation activities in firms. The system 
should stimulate intense linkages among organisations in order to steer innovation 
system to greater strategic competence in firms, clusters, regions and countries. The 
system failure approach means a shift in emphasis from subsidising firms to 
developing appropriate framework conditions for the generation and diffusion of 
innovations. There is however no optimal innovation policy. Policymaking must be 
based on informed use of theory, information and subjective judgement. There is a 
need for an adaptive policy maker (as opposed to an optimising policy maker) and 
policy learning as an integrated part of the policy making process. In this approach 
the policy maker is seen, not as knowing better than firms but as knowing different 
things. 
Indicators of the supply and usage of innovation-related services for policy steering 
purposes should tell us something about the need of public intervention. This means 
that indicators should reflect different reasons for market or system failure. 
According to the market failure rationale there is always a tendency for 
underinvestment in R&D by private firms. However, theory tells us nothing about 
the optimal rate of R&D. Comparisons of the volume of R&D between countries and 
sectors are often used as an indicator of underinvestment in innovative activities. In 
the innovation system approach the methods of benchmarking and best practice are 
used to identify promising areas of intervention and policy initiatives. The system 
failure rationale identifies the areas to be included in such exercises. But this is only 
the first step in identifying what government should do. The literature review shows 
that in both rationales there is a need to empirically establish if there is a failure in 
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regard to the supply of innovation-relate services and the nature of this failure before 
any public intervention. 
The economic rationales say that government should intervene in the supply 
innovation-related services only if a market or a system failure exists. According to 
market failure the production of services may be better kept within the public sphere 
if they can be characterised as public goods, while the others should be left to private 
firms. It is an empirical task to identify which services are public goods and which 
are not. The system failure rationale focuses on actors in a system and their 
interaction. Innovation-related services can be supplied by public or private 
organisations. The policy implications are not evident but the potential scope for 
public provision of innovation-related services is substantial. If any right balance 
exists between public and private suppliers it is not possible to deduce it from theory.  
The system failure approach opens up for innovation policies that focus on the 
shaping of technological variety generation and selection mechanisms. In this 
approach not only R&D are in focus but also other policy domains such as education, 
competition and labour markets. All elements of the system need to work together 
towards a common goal. Thus, in the design and implementation of policy initiatives 
all stakeholders should be involved. The initiatives should also be co-ordinated at the 
ministerial and public agency levels. Due to the complexity of innovation systems 
there is justification for policy experimentation. This in turn means that evaluations 
of initiatives are necessary for the purpose of policy learning and for avoiding 
government failure.  
While neo-classic theory is one of static equilibrium and contractual agreement 
between actors, the evolutionary theory and the innovation system approach is one of 
interaction and learning processes and dynamics in innovation system. In the RISE-
project the key words are dynamics, interactivity and learning. Thus the system 
failure rationale for intervention has more to offer than the market failure rationale in 
terms of areas an instruments for government involvement in the supply and use of 
innovation-related services. 
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